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ABSTRACT
With increasing integration in SoCs, the Network-on-Chip 
(NoC) connecting of cores and accelerators is of paramount im-
portance to provide low-latency and high-throughput commu-
nication. Due to limits of scaling of electrical wires, especially
for long multi-mm distances on-chip, alternate technologies
such as Wireless NoC (WNoC) have shown promise. Since 
WNoCs can provide low-latency one-hop transfers across 
the entire chip, there has been a recent surge in research
demonstrating their performance and energy benefits. How-
ever, little to no work has studied the additional security
challenges that are unique to WNoCs. In this work, we study 
the potential threat of spoofing a ttacks i n WNoCs due to
malicious hardware trojans. We introduce Veritas, a drop-in 
solution aimed at detecting and correcting such spoofing
attacks. To this end, our solution exploits the static prop-
agation environment of WNoCs to associate each node to
a power profile. We demonstrate that, with small area and 
power overheads, Veritas works well in a variety of settings.
1 INTRODUCTION
Network-on-Chip (NoC) is currently the paradigm of choice
to interconnect the different components of System-on-Chips 
(SoCs) or Chip Multiprocessors (CMPs). As the levels of
integration continue to grow, however, current NoCs face sig-
nificant scalability l imitations, and have prompted research 
in novel interconnect technologies. Among these, wireless on-
chip communications have garnered considerable attention
due to their low latency, architectural flexibility, and inherent 
broadcast capabilities [2, 7, 13]. Architecting manycore sys-
tems with Wireless Network-on-Chips (WNoCs) is an active 
area of research [3] since low-latency broadcasts can facilitate
scalable coherence and consistency.
Figure 1: Schematic representation of Veritas within a wired-
wireless NoC architecture.
The adoption of the WNoC paradigm brings up many new
challenges. Among them, security is one that has not received
much attention from the community. The broadcast nature
of the wireless transmissions introduces new points of entry
for an attacker to compromise the chip, as we describe in this
work. If accesses to the wireless medium are not protected,
smart Hardware Trojans (HTs) placed in the network or in
third-party components can degrade the system performance,
write corrupt data in memory, or steal sensitive information.
This paper focuses on one of the potential threats to a
WNoC, spoofing, or impersonating another entity to gain
unauthorized access. We build on the observation that WNoCs
are different from both wired NoCs and traditional wireless
networks in terms of their communication mechanism and
latency thresholds, which renders solutions from both do-
mains inapplicable and drives the need for novel fast and
light-weight solutions.
The main contribution of this paper is Veritas, a light-
weight solution that can detect a spoofing attack caused by
a HT inside of a WNoC. Spoofing attacks are remediated
opportunistically by comparing the reception power profiles
of the presumed and actual source of a message. Through
performance and cost analysis, we show that Veritas can
protect a WNoC from advanced HTs with small overheads.
This paper is set forth as follows. First, we provide some
background on WNoC in Sec. 2. Next, we discuss the threat
model in Sec. 3 and our proposed architecture solution in
Sec. 4. Then, we evaluate our proposal in Sec. 5, discuss
related work in Sec. 6, and conclude the paper in Sec. 7.
2 BACKGROUND
As exemplified in Figure 1, the WNoC paradigm basically
comprises a co-integration of antennas and transceivers with
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Figure 2: The wireless intra-chip channel.
cores, complementing the wired NoC. Information is first
modulated by the transceiver at a frequency much higher
than the processor clock, e.g. 60 GHz [3], and then radiated by
the local antenna. Signals propagate within the chip package
and are received by all the tuned-in antennas.
Figure 2 illustrates the typical structure of a flip-chip pack-
age, which is crucial to understand wave propagation in a
WNoC. The chip consists of a set of metal layers within an
insulator (SiO2) placed on a silicon substrate. This structure
is flipped, connected to the system via an array of metallic
micro-bumps, and covered with a metallic heat sink. In this
configuration, signals reach the receivers possibly after mul-
tiple reflections [6], but cannot scatter outside the package.
Note that, around 60 GHz, the micro-bumps and subsequent
metallizations obstruct the signals because their pitch (∼100
µm) is much lower than the wavelength of the radio waves
(∼1 mm) [6]. Thus, in such a controlled environment, humid-
ity effects on propagation are negligible and signals cannot
leak to or come from outside the package.
The transceiver interfaces the antenna with three modules.
The physical layer (PHY) modulates and amplifies the signals
to a known, controlled power level minimizing transmission
errors. Then, the Medium Access Control layer (MAC) en-
sures that all nodes can access the medium reliably, either
by completely avoiding collisions [13] or by managing then
in schemes where nodes contend for the channel [14]. Fi-
nally, the Network Interface (NIF), located between the core
and the transceiver, performs address translation and ad-
mission control tasks. A unique trait of WNoC is that its
static and quasi-deterministic propagation allows to design
PHY/MAC/NIF solutions to fine-tune transmitted power
[15], detect collisions [14] and, as we propose in this work,
protect nodes from spoofing attacks.
3 THREAT MODEL: SPOOFING
Since the WNoC naturally acts as a shared medium [2], any
node can broadcast information. This can be leveraged by
malicious cores to cause system-level problems by manipulat-
ing the source address of flits. Hence, it is important to have
a mechanism to detect these anomalies in a timely manner
to prevent application or data corruption.
Spoofing could be employed to respond to legitimate re-
quests originally intended for a given node 𝑥. Before 𝑥 can
answer with the requested information, another rogue node
𝑟 responds with false information, causing the application to
crash. A more complex 𝑟 might respond with incorrect data
that does not lead to a crash, but rather to incorrect outputs
or loss in performance. In both cases, insecure WNoCs may
be an entry point for spoofed messages.
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Figure 3: Potential Spoof Attack: Average Memory Access Time
(AMAT) of workloads as a function of probability of spoof
invalidations to the L1 from a rogue Directory.
To quantify the harm of a potential form of spoofing attack,
we modeled a scenario where the malicious node 𝑟 spoofs
the directory ID and continually asks 𝑥 to invalidate lines in
its L1 cache with some probability relative to requests. We
simulated this across a suite of cloud workloads. Figure 3
demonstrates that even with 10% spoof invalidations, the
performance can drop by 27% on average, especially if the
workloads have high L1 hit rates in the healthy scenario.
An aggressive spoofer that broadcasts invalidates at 75%
can make the average performance drop by 2.8×. This is an
attack that could be disguised since a drop in L1 hit rate is
a performance issue, but will not make the program crash.
In this work, we consider that spoofing attacks can only be
performed from inside the system because signals cannot pass
through the chip package, as discussed in Sec. 2. Besides this,
it is common practice to assume that the HT is placed in a
digital circuit due to the complexity of RF design. Therefore,
HTs cannot alter the PHY layer and, more specifically, the
amplifier that determines the RF power profile. Another
common assumption we make is that Veritas, our solution,
cannot be compromised [5].
4 SECURE ANTI-SPOOFING
MICROARCHITECTURE: VERITAS
We design Veritas, a hardware solution that leverages the
uniquenesses of WNoC to address spoofing attacks. We can-
not guarantee authenticity using asymmetric keys, which is a
widespread technique in wireless networks, because it requires
a large amount of resources. Asymmetric encryption can be
orders of magnitude slower than symmetric encryption, which
even in the best case requires several cycles per byte [18],
thus becoming a huge bottleneck in the processor. Fast and
lightweight alternatives are required instead.
Overview. The WNoC paradigm offers a unique possibility of
using the received RF power levels to determine the identity
of the source of a given packet. In conventional wireless com-
munications, propagation is modeled as a stochastic process
as it depends on many random factors such as the environ-
ment, mobility, blocking, and so on. On the contrary, the
WNoC scenario is static and can be explored thoroughly. In
fact, the path loss between any two antennas can be measured
beforehand via an accurate channel characterization.
Building on this observation, Veritas converts the received
power into an effective source address and compares it with
the ID contained in the packet header. A mismatch raises
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Figure 4: Schematic representation of the Veritas module inte-
grated in the chip corners C1–C4.
a spoofing alert. The challenge with the power profile is
that nodes equidistant from the transmitter may receive
very similar powers, making it hard to detect a spoofer if it
happens to lie on the same contour as the expected sender.
To handle potential false positives, we propose to place the
Veritas modules at the cores located at the corners of the chip
(C1–C4) and detect spoofers with trilateration. We validate
this in our evaluations and demonstrate that this placement
is sufficient to uniquely distinguish between every sender1.
Microarchitecture. Figure 4 depicts the microarchitecture of
the Veritas module. In a setup phase, each and every node
of the network is prompted to send an initialization message
in order. This needs to be done only once and it is used by
the nodes equipped with Veritas to fill an address conversion
table with {source address, voltage level} pairs.
During runtime, for every received message, the power from
the MAC is probed by a Power Detector (PD), for which
designs exist for on-chip and millimeter-wave (mmWave) ap-
plications [19]. The PD translates the power level at the
output of the receiver’s low-noise amplifier (LNA) into a
voltage level 𝑉𝑃𝐷, which is later converted into a digital
quantity using a 𝑛-bit Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC).
The MAC module also provides the source address of the
packet, which is translated into a digital representation of
a voltage level using the address conversion table. Finally,
the two voltages are compared only when the MAC module
confirms no collision. A mismatch is broadcast by Veritas,
forcing all nodes to ignore all wireless messages until the OS
solves the issue. The OS can either power gate the wireless
NIF of the rogue node or preempt the rogue thread.
Design Issues. Without loss of generality, let us assume that
all nodes are allocated with the same RF power. Since equidis-
tant cores may reach some corner nodes with very similar
power levels, two entries of the conversion table may contain
the same voltage value. To address this, all duplicate entries
are set to zero and the comparator is designed to not raise
the flag when one of the operands is zero. Then, the PD and
the ADC are carefully designed to avoid the same duplicate
entries in the four corners, ensuring that all nodes can be
unequivocally identified using the received power.
To evaluate the dynamic range of the PD, the wireless
channel needs to be characterized to determine the maxi-
mum and minimum power expected at the corners. Even
1Three locations are enough, but more robustness can be added by
placing Veritas at multiple cores at the cost of higher area and power.
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Figure 5: Radiation pattern of evaluated antennas: aperture
(left), monopole (center), and patch (right).
within the dynamic range, PDs may incur into a linearity
error. Another source of uncertainty is the ADC, which only
allows to distinguish between 2𝑛 voltage levels for an 𝑛-bit
implementation. Finally, thermal noise can also introduce
variations in the received signal. However, the impact of noise
is low since the error rate requirements of the scenario force
to have very large signal-to-noise ratios. As we will see next,
Veritas takes all these issues into consideration.
5 EVALUATION
Simulation Methodology. We evaluate Veritas by performing
the power profiling of a typical chip. We use CST MWS [1], a
full-wave electromagnetic simulation tool, to model a 20×20
mm2 die within a realistic flip-chip package. Antennas and
circuits are placed within a 13-µm thick SiO2 (loss-free, 𝜀𝑟
= 3.9), which has a 500 µm-thick layer of bulk silicon (𝜌 =
10 Ω-cm, 𝜀𝑟 = 11.9) and a metallic heat sink on top, and
rests over an array of solder bumps with 100-µm pitch and a
ceramic carrier. We divide the chip into 4×4 tiles and place
an integrated 60-GHz antenna in each tile. Note that the
methodology is amenable not only to multiprocessors, but to
any application involving a WNoC [4].
To demonstrate the validity of Veritas in different WNoC
designs, we consider three types of antennas. The antennas
are sketched in Fig. 5 together with their on-chip radiation
patterns2. The aperture is a slot cut out of a metallic plane
within the SiO2, small enough to generate a quasi-isotropic
radiation at 60 GHz. Due to chip package effects, the aper-
ture tends to radiate towards the heat sink. The monopole
antenna is a vertical, single-ended TSV, that radiates al-
most omnidirectionally in the co-planar direction. Finally,
the patch antenna is a metallic sheet placed in the first layers
of the metal stack. Fed from the side, the patch radiates
mostly upwards with a dipole-like behavior in the azimuth.
See [12] for more details on the different antennas.
For all node pairs and antenna types, we evaluate |𝑆𝑖𝑗 |2 =
𝑃𝑟,𝑖 / 𝑃𝑡,𝑗 , this is, the fraction of signal transmitted from
node 𝑗 that is received by node 𝑖. The 𝑆 matrix is enough
to obtain the power profile within the chip because the RF
power allocation strategy (𝑃𝑡,𝑗 for all 𝑗) is known.
Results. After obtaining the 𝑆 matrix for the different anten-
nas, we determine the resolution required to avoid having
2Radiation patterns are typically evaluated in the far field, which is
not necessarily the case here. However, they still help to understand
the RF power profile.
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Figure 6: Power at the four corners with patch antennas.
the same duplicated entries in the four corners. Figure 6
exemplifies this process for the patch antenna: the max-min
power distance, which determines the dynamic range of the
PD, is ∼49 dB. After checking all combinations, we identify
nodes 5 and 9 as the worst case. Those nodes reach all corners
with similar power; the ambiguity, however, is resolved by C1
and C3, whose received powers differ by ∼4.6 dB. Thus, if
noise and PD-ADC errors are less than 4.6 dB, then Veritas
unequivocally identifies all nodes. With the dynamic range
of 49 dB, this resolution is achieved with 𝑛 = 5 bits.
Since each antenna has a distinct radiation pattern, differ-
ent results are obtained (see Table 1). Due to their almost
omnidirectional radiation in the chip plane, the monopole and
the aperture have lower dynamic range requirements. Also,
the attenuation of signals over distance is more predictable
at all directions, reducing the amount of ambiguous cases.
As a result, the resolution requirements are relaxed.
Overhead. Veritas would incur minimal area and power over-
heads. PDs as small as 0.006 mm2 consuming less than 1
mW could meet the requirements set above [19]. Moreover,
an ADC operating at ∼100 MS/s (enough to allow spoofing
protection on a per-packet basis) with 9-bit resolution has
been reported to occupy 0.028 mm2 and consume less than 1
mW [11]. Since the anti-spoof module is only placed in four
locations, the cost is also scalable.
6 RELATED WORK
Secure Wireless Networks-on-Chip. Using small world topolo-
gies, researchers have found ways of relieving single-node DoS
attacks in a NoC, but do not address spoofing attacks [9]. To
prevent eavesdropping and spoofing, one solution proposes a
hash-based authentication with secret key [16] which incurs a
huge latency cost of several hundreds of cycles per validation.
To the best of our knowledge, no other work has addressed
spoofing attacks in a WNoC and, in this context, Veritas
represents a cost-effective solution.
Other scenarios. NoC researchers have proposed to establish
some standards for securing wired NoCs and the access rights
to memory units [8]. These solutions use high overhead en-
cryption and do not take into account effects on the network.
Another proposal uses an AES-like symmetric key encryption
combined with an asymmetric key (anti-Spoofing) encryp-
tion [10]. In wireless sensor networks, some proposals combat
spoofing by using neighbor-specific asymmetric keys, which
still causes delays unacceptable for WNoC [17]. Likewise,
high-latency RC6 stream cipher are used in [20] to create key
pairs out of master keys, making it prohibitive in a WNoC.
Table 1: Summary of results for different antennas.
Antenna Dynamic Range Resolution Number of bits
Aperture 38.12 dB 8.9 dB ≥4
Monopole 40.03 dB 8.2 dB ≥4
Patch 48.98 dB 4.6 dB ≥5
7 CONCLUSION
Veritas is a new microarchitecture to secure WNoCs from 
the spoofing vulnerability associated with wireless commu-
nications. Using RF power profiles, Veritas can detect and 
reconcile HTs attempting to spoof the source address of an-
other node in the system. Results have shown that, with 
small increases in power and area, Veritas works in a 4×4 
WNoC assuming a variety of antennas. In denser networks, 
we anticipate that the requirements of Veritas will increase 
moderately. Future works will further explore scalability and 
ways to reduce the dynamic range.
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